Iraq's Covid-19 Response

Iraq is expecting its first batch of coronavirus vaccines to arrive in the next few weeks. "These deliveries are emergency deliveries to vaccinate the priority groups — those with high risk: medical and health staff, security personnel, persons over 50 years old, and people who have chronic illnesses," said Dr. Reyadh Abdul Amir, director general of the Iraqi Health Ministry's Public Health directorate, in an interview with Iraq Oil Report. The doses are badly needed as a new wave of infections threatens to overwhelm Iraq's under-resourced healthcare system. Case numbers have been rising steadily since mid-January: 3,575 new infections were diagnosed nationwide on Feb. 18, compared to just 645 on Jan. 18.

Iraqi health officials are facing criticism for delays in the vaccine rollout. "My personal expectation is that there is no control over the vaccine distribution," said one Iraqi doctor who has worked on a coronavirus ward. "In Iraq we have fractured governance, which doesn't have one systematized authority controlling it, so it's possible that this will be exploited and distribution will take place perhaps on the black market. Maybe there will be favoritism." Even in a best-case scenario, Abdul Amir said, limited global vaccine supplies mean that only about 30 percent of the Iraqi population will be vaccinated this year — far from the threshold for herd immunity. Read the full story on Iraq Oil Report.

Both the federal Iraqi government and the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) are implementing new pandemic-related travel restrictions. On Thursday, Iraq's Council of Ministers announced a complete ban on travel between Iraqi provinces, with exceptions for humanitarian reasons and state employees, according to Sura Ali, reporting for Rudaw. On Monday, the KRG announced that it would be restricting travel to and from federal Iraq, following reports that the new UK variant now makes up half of covid-19 cases in Iraq. On Feb. 18, nighttime and weekend curfews were introduced in Iraq, as well as the closure of universities, salons, parks, weddings and funerals.

Such measures are unlikely to have much effect without better implementation of public health measures like masking and social distancing. “I am a doctor fighting public ignorance, not the pandemic,” said Mohammed Shahada, a pulmonologist at Baghdad’s al-Zahra Hospital, in an interview with the AP's Abdulrahamn Zeyad, bemoaning the general public's poor adherence to social distancing measures. The problem isn't just a lack of widespread education and credible information. Mac Skelton, a medical sociologist at the American University of Iraq in Sulaimaniyah, said Iraqi responses to the pandemic need to be understood in the context of the country's collective experience of wars, political violence and sanctions. In comparison to that history, the pandemic "might not stack up as a major problem." Moreover, many Iraqis have never had access to health care that is consistent, accessible, and trustworthy, creating major cultural and institutional hurdles for public health education.

How To Transport Personnel in a Pandemic

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And to hear directly from FronteraSky President Carlos Barbosa, read his interview with Iraq Oil Report.

Proxy Battles

U.S. President Joe Biden directed air strikes on Thursday against Iran-backed militants in eastern Syria. The strikes "destroyed multiple facilities at a border point used by a number of Iranian-backed militant groups, including Kata’ib Hezbollah and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada," according to a Pentagon spokesperson, who said the strikes "were authorized in response to recent attacks against American and Coalition personnel in Iraq." On Monday, three rockets were fired at the Green Zone in Baghdad, apparently targeting the U.S. Embassy. And a week earlier, on Feb. 15, a barrage of 107mm rockets hit locations near a U.S. military base in Erbil, killing one civilian contractor and injuring nine others. A newly formed pro-Iran militia named Saraya Awliya al-Dam ("Guardians of Blood") claimed responsibility for the attack according to Hassan Ali Ahmed, reporting for Al Monitor. Ahmed says the militia is likely a front for the Iraqi political and paramilitary organization Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which is supported by Iran.

Kataib Hezbollah denied any role in recent rocket attacks against U.S. targets in Iraq. “We absolutely did not target Erbil or the Green Zone and have no knowledge of the group that did,” said Mohammed Mohi, a spokesperson for Kataib Hezbollah, in an interview with Reuters two days before the U.S. strikes in Syria. Meanwhile, an anonymous Iran-backed militia official in Baghdad told the AP’s Qassim Abdul-Zahra that drones targeting Saudi Arabia’s royal palace last month were launched from inside Iraq. When asked about that attack, Mohi was not so categorical in denying responsibility. "We have not claimed it," he told Reuters, "but we do say that people in the region who have suffered from Saudi [policy] have the right to retaliate."

Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi's border crackdown is facing strong resistance. As part of an indirect effort to counter Iran-backed armed groups, Kadhimi initiated a campaign last year to reassert control over border crossings, where hundreds of millions of dollars were being lost due to corruption. While there has been some notable evidence of progress — including a significant increase in customs revenue collected by the state — there are still some border crossings where impunity reigns. In Diyala province, the Badr organisation and its affiliates enjoy de facto sovereignty, according to researchers Zmkan Ali Saleem and Mac Skelton. Furthermore, Iraqi authorities who oversee border revenues in the province are themselves aligned with Badr, "and there is little if any prospect of disentangling the two." In the Kurdistan region, the two major political parties, the KDP and PUK, control the major border posts, and "any substantive reassertion of federal authority at the borders would destabilize" those parties' economic and political relationships with Turkey and Iran. The authors conclude that in both Diyala and Iraqi Kurdistan, "Kadhimi’s border campaign realized its limits in the face of Iraq’s party-controlled political structure."

If leaders in Baghdad and Washington want to respond effectively to Iran-backed forces in Iraq, they should first understand the nature of those forces. Writing for Chatham House, Renad Mansour has produced an authoritative study of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which include a range of paramilitary formations — some that are closely aligned with the Iraqi state and its formal military chain of command, some that are linked with political parties, and some that are directly trained and funded by Iran. There is also overlap among the groups. Mansour argues that the PMF is not a "coherent, integrated organization but is instead a series of fluid and adaptive networks connected to power structures within the Iraqi state." This makes it especially challenging to formulate policy:

For Western actors and the current government of Iraq, policy options on the PMF have focused on how best to remove perceived malign actors and to integrate those deemed acceptable into the government, with an eye to establishing a centralized command structure. To achieve this strategy, they have pursued a series of policy options that follow one of two approaches: eliminate or integrate. The former includes policies that seek to fragment, isolate and undermine, weaken or eliminate particular networks from the PMF.... The second approach involves a series of policy options that seek to shape PMF behavior or prospects by focusing on accountability to the central government. Policymakers have struggled to translate either approach into tangible results because they have not been guided by a clear, coherent and realistic strategy that recognizes and navigates the networks that currently make up the Iraqi state.

... Even if elements might be isolated or co-opted, it would likely have a minimal impact on PMF networks since they are so widely diffused. The PMF is not a series of disparate groups with a few individuals playing a bridging role to other PMF groups or other political, religious or business interests in Iraq. Instead, a very high percentage of actors, or brokers, within each network play an interconnecting and bridging role. In fact, so many actors are ‘double-hatted’ in their positions, affiliations and loyalties, that even the distinctions between groups (within the PMF, as well as between the PMF and other state or non-state entities) are muddied. The networks do not depend on a cohesive whole or on an uninterrupted, institutionalized chain of command to operate. The series of networks that make up the PMF are fluid and adaptable to isolation strategies. Consequently, so-called ‘co-optable’ individuals have at times turned their backs on agreements made with U.S. or foreign policymakers.

There are no easy solutions. But Mansour suggests that no policy will succeed in reducing the influence of PMF elements unless it proceeds from an understanding of their operations and sources of power. In the short term, progress is most likely to be achieved by working through formal and informal brokers within the PMF network. "The key is to create sufficient incentives to push these brokers towards reform while minimizing their ability to reject the idea. Critically, these network brokers need not be directly in the PMF. They can also be in other parts of the Iraqi state network but may enjoy strong relations with PMF networks."

More Top Stories

Kurdish journalist Sherwan Sherwani was sentenced in an Erbil court to six years in prison on charges of spying. Sherwani is the editor-in-chief of Bashur magazine and covered last year’s protests against KRG corruption and economic challenges. He told the court he was tortured mentally and physically while under investigation. According to Rebaz Majeed, reporting for VOA, Sherwani’s lawyer said journalistic materials were presented as evidence of spying, and that KRG Prime Minister Masrur Barzani had described the journalists as spies in a press conference a week before the trial. At the trial, the journalists and activists were all charged under Kurdish law relating to crimes that damage "the security, stability and the sovereignty of Iraqi Kurdistan Regional institutions."

Evidence shown in court included messages from an online group chat, photos from cell phones, voice recordings, and witness testimonies. The group chat information was reportedly about an illegal oil field in Dohuk province, and photos of a political party headquarters, an airport, and security personnel. “Some of [the photos] were already published in 2015 in Bashur,” said Bashdar Hassan, Sherwani’s lawyer. "The security forces recorded [Sherwani's and his friends'] occupations as ‘worker’ instead of ‘journalist,’ in order to prevent using the journalism law in their case," said Rahman Gharib, the coordinator of the Metro Center for Journalist Rights and Advocacy, describing a KRG law meant to protect journalists from being jailed for their work.

European governments should clearly communicate their opposition to a potential Turkish military incursion in Sinjar, according to Nussaibah Younis, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. "They are well placed to support Kadhimi as he seeks to implement the Sinjar Agreement and re-establish Baghdad’s control over Sinjar, which remains the best pathway towards diluting the PKK’s influence in the area," Younis argues. She describes such a possible Turkish incursion as being "highly counterproductive," as it would risk weakening Kadhimi while also strengthening PMF groups in the area, fail to achieve lasting gains against the PKK, and "severely damage the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Iraq."

Oil Companies Face New Regulatory Hurdles

A message from New Frontiers:

International oil companies, oil service companies, and other contractors in Iraq face a major new compliance challenge. The oil sector has long enjoyed a de facto exemption from some Iraqi regulations, including Ministry of Labor requirements associated with social security and work permits. But in September 2020, the government started enforcing the rules on foreign oil contractors. If they don't comply, companies risk severe consequences — including payment delays, visa problems, and exclusion from tenders.

To learn more about these latest challenges, Iraq Oil Report spoke with Steve Rahola and Mustafa al-Janabi, two key leaders of New Frontiers Business Consulting. For more than a decade, New Frontiers — which is also known by its Kurdish-language name, Asteki Nwe — has been on the ground navigating Iraq's bureaucracy, gaining the experience and relationships necessary to help foreign companies. Read the full interview here.

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