The Problem with the Narrative of ‘Proxy War’ in Iraq

Douglas A. Ollivant and Erica Gaston write for War on the Rocks:

On May 7, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made a surprise visit to Baghdad, warning Iraqi officials that the United States had a right to respond to attacks “by Iran or its proxies in Iraq or anywhere else.” His comments came after a month of escalating U.S.-Iranian tensions over the designation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, renewed U.S. sanctions on Iran, and threats and counter-attacks in the Strait of Hormuz.

Just over a week later, the United States evacuated all non-essential U.S. personnel from Iraq on the grounds that Iranian-linked militias — embedded within a now-official Iraqi security force, the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) — might have been on the verge of mounting an attack. The intelligence suggesting that these militias presented an increased threat was met with skepticism, including by Maj. Gen. Chris Ghika, second in command of the Combined Joint Task Force — Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). Analysts and U.S. officials alike questioned whether the United States was not so much inflating as overreacting to the threat because of the perceived association of these forces with Iran.

To be sure, these Iranian-linked groups are dangerous, and likely would have no qualms about launching rockets on U.S. embassies or consulates. Many of these militias would attack U.S. assets (and have before, for which some of them were designated as terrorists by the United States). However, even if these groups are worth watching, the recent escalation also illustrates how the narrative of proxy warfare can misdiagnose the nature of the threat and help escalate a geopolitical standoff based on what are in reality local actors’ strategic positionings and machinations.